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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In this consolidated appeal, Kent E. Hall appeals from the district court's order 
denying his request for appointment of counsel and summarily dismissing his petitions 
for post-conviction relief. He asserts that the district court erred when, in denying his 
request for appointment of counsel, it concluded that none of his claims suggested even 
the possibility of a valid claim. He further asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied his motion for a continuance in order to give him time to 
provide additional information in support of his claims. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the criminal cases underlying his post-conviction petitions, Mr. Hall pled guilty 
to possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to deliver and 
delivery of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). (R., pp.12, 18.) He received 
concurrent, unified sentences of twelve years, with five years fixed, for those 
convictions. The district court did not retain jurisdiction or suspend the sentence in 
either case. (R., pp.13-15, 19-21.) 
Mr. Hall filed verified petitions for post-conviction relief in two cases. 1 He 
supported his petitions with an affidavit and several attachments, including several 
memoranda from the Idaho State Police describing misconduct and deception, including 
the unauthorized possession of controlled substances, by forensic scientists employed 
1 The two petitions are identical in all respects, and each contains both criminal case 
numbers. As such, citation will be made to only one of the petitions contained in the 
consolidated record. 
1 
at the Pocatello laboratory. (R., pp.1-23, 79-101.) Mr. Hall's claims were that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel, that his "plea was not knowingly or 
voluntarily entered because it was induced by unkept [sic] promises" made by defense 
counsel, and "[t]he conviction and sentence is in violation of the U.S. and Idaho State 
Constitution[s]." (R., p.2.) Mr. Hall sought the appointment of counsel to assist him in 
pursuing his claims. (R., p.24.) 
In an affidavit in support of his petitions, Mr. Hall supported the coerced plea 
allegation with a statement that "[t]o induce me to enter a guilty plea in my cases, I was 
PROMISED I would receive DRUG COURT and subsequent probation, NO PRISON 
TERM." (R., p.6 (capitalization in original).) With respect to the claim that his conviction 
and sentence were obtained in violation of the state and federal constitutions, Mr. Hall 
explained, "ISP Forensic labs corrupted the alleged drug samples submitted in my case 
(see attached letters from ISP Major Kendrick Wills, Forensic services commander) and 
thus violated my rights to due process." (R., p.6.) With respect to his allegation that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Hall explained, inter alia, that his attorney 
was ineffective for refusing to file motions to withdraw his guilty pleas upon learning of 
the misconduct at the State crime laboratory. (R., p.6.) 
The district court filed a Notice of Intent to Deny Counsel and Dismiss Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter, Notice). (R., p.43.) As an initial matter, the district 
court concluded that none of Mr. Hall's claims raised even the possibility of a valid claim 
necessitating the appointment of counsel because, 
[His] allegation that his guilty plea was not voluntary due to false promises 
... is directly contradicted by the record. Furthermore, the Petition and 
Affidavit do not provide facts or argument relative to how the "potential 
Brady/Giglio material" actually affected these cases. Finally, Hall's 
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ineffective assistance arguments are directly dependent on the previously 
mentioned allegations. 
(R., pp.47-4S.) 
In the portion of its Notice addressing the basis for summarily dismissing his 
Petition, the district court provided greater detail as to its conclusions that Mr. Hall failed 
to suggest even the possibility of a valid claim. In addressing Mr. Hall's claim that his 
guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary "because he was induced by a false promise 
that he would be diverted into drug court, without a prison sentence," the district court 
explained that it "finds that there is no merit to Hall's allegation" because "[p]rior to 
pleading guilty, Hall completed a guilty plea questionnaire in each of his cases" in which 
he "affirmed in the questionnaire the terms of his plea agreement" and "responded in 
each questionnaire that no person had promised a special sentence, reward, favorable 
treatment or leniency with regard to his plea." The district court went on to note, 
"Finally, Hall responded in the questionnaire[s] that he understood that no one, including 
his attorney could force him to plead guilty in his case, and that his guilty plea was being 
entered freely and voluntarily.,,2 (R., p.4S.) 
With respect to the claim that Mr. Hall's constitutional rights were violated by the 
State's failure to disclose information concerning misconduct at the State crime 
laboratory, the district court explained, 
When a defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty all challenges to 
non-jurisdictional defects are simultaneously waived. As discussed 
above, the Court finds that Hall's guilty plea was not induced by a false 
promise and that the plea was therefore knowingly and voluntarily made. 
Because his plea was knowing and voluntary Hall waived his ability to 
claim that improprieties at the state lab led to his conviction. 
2 A file-stamped copy of the guilty plea questionnaire used for both cases is attached to 
a Motion to Augment filed on May 16, 2013. 
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(R., pp.49-S0 (footnote citing Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826 (Ct. App. 1985) 
omitted).) 
As to his claim that his attorney coerced him to plead guilty by making false 
promises concerning the plea agreement, the district court reasoned, "Hall's 
unsupported allegations of attorney coercion do not create a valid ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim." (R., p.S1.) With respect to his claim that his attorney was ineffective 
for failing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, the district court explained that 
Mr. Hall had "failed to show" that his attorney's failure to file such a motion "was 
unreasonable or violated professional norms." The district court continued, 
Hall has merely set forth conclusory allegations regarding his counsel's 
strategic decisions. As stated above, the Court cannot see any relevance 
between the incidents at the ISP forensics lab and the testing of the drugs 
in Hall's case. Furthermore, as discussed above, a voluntary guilty plea is 
a waiver of non-jurisdictional defects because, in effect, the defendant is 
admitting that he knowingly committed the acts that make up the elements 
of a crime; therefore, forensic testing becomes moot .... [3] 
Additionally, Hall has failed to show that his counsel's decisions not to file 
frivolous motions have prejudiced him. Because Hall has failed to prove 
either part of the Strickland test his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel fails. 
(R., pp.S1-S3.) 
In response to the district court's Notice, Mr. Hall filed a Motion for Continuance, 
in which he sought a thirty day continuance because: 
3 Omitted language concerns a document cited to by the district court concerning 
statements purportedly made by Mr. Hall to police officers and the results of a 
"presumptive field test" purportedly conducted on evidence in one of the criminal cases. 
A file-stamped copy of this document is attached to a Motion to Augment filed on 
May 16, 2013. 
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[H]e is in the process of preparing and serving SUBPOENAS DUCES 
TECUM upon the Idaho State Police Forensic laboratory to obtain the 
investigative report that will support his contentions of boched [sic] testing 
of the alleged narcotics in the above entitled cases, and such will show 
that plaintiff is entitled to the relief he seeks in his PCR petitions. 
(R, pp.133-34 (capitalization in original).) 
In denying Mr. Hall's Motion for Continuance, the district court explained that 
"any allegations that he may have that the narcotics testing done in connection with his 
case was defective is irrelevant" because "when a defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
pleads guilty to the underlying charges all challenges to non-jurisdictional defects are 
simultaneously waived." The district court then ordered his petitions to be dismissed. 
(R., p.137 (footnote citing Stone omitted).) A judgment was later entered dismissing 
both petitions. (R., p.157.) 
Mr. Hall filed a premature Notice of Appeal following the dismissal of his 
petitions.4 (R., p.139.) 
4 Recognizing the fact that the district court had failed to enter judgments dismissing the 
petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court suspended the appeals and temporarily remanded 
the case for entry of judgments of dismissal. (R., p.159.) In response, the district court 
entered a judgment of dismissal as to both cases. (R., p.157.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hall's request for appointment of post-
conviction counsel because his petition suggested, at a minimum, the possibility 
of a valid claim? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hall's motion for a 
continuance because its reasoning in doing so was legally incorrect? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hall's Request For Appointment Of Post-
Conviction Counsel Because His Petition Suggested, At A Minimum, The Possibility Of 
A Valid Claim 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hall asserts that the district court's refusal to appoint counsel to assist him in 
the prosecution of his Petition was in error. For the reasons set forth below, he satisfied 
the standard for appointment of counsel under Idaho Code § 19-4904 because his 
Petition suggested, at a minimum, the possibility of a valid claim. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
1. Appointment Of Counsel 
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction proceeding is 
governed by Idaho Code § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the 
UPCPA [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act], a court-appointed attorney 'may be 
made available' to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of representation. The 
decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion 
of the district court." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004). 
In Charboneau, the Supreme Court held that a post-conviction petitioner is 
entitled to the appointment of counsel "unless the trial court determines that the post-
conviction proceeding is frivolous." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792 (quoting Brown v. 
State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001 ». It further held that the proceeding is not frivolous 
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and, thus, counsel must be appointed, if the petitioner "alleges facts to raise the 
possibility of a valid claim .... " Id. at 793 (emphasis added). 
More recently, in Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651 (2007), the Supreme Court had 
occasion to revisit the standard for appointment of counsel in post-conviction cases. In 
that case, the Court reaffirmed the Charboneau standard: 
In deciding whether the pro se petition raises the possibility of a valid 
claim, the trial court should consider whether the facts alleged are such 
that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain 
counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims. Although "the 
petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the 
record for possible nonfrivolous claims," Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 
679,23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001), the court should appoint counsel if the facts 
alleged raise the possibility of a valid claim. 
Swader, 143 Idaho at 654. The Swader Court also made it clear that this standard is 
much lower than the standard for deciding petitions for post-conviction relief on their 
merits because, as had also been recognized in Charboneau, pro se petitioners 
generally cannot investigate or properly present their claims (regardless of whether 
those claims will ultimately be successful) without the assistance of counsel. Id. at 654-
55. 
2. Standard Of Review 
As noted above, in Charboneau, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "[t]he 
decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion 
of the district court." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792. Indeed, since Charboneau was 
decided in 2004, the Idaho Supreme Court has continued to describe the standard for 
appointment of counsel in discretionary terms. See Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 738 
(2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,529 (2007). From this language one would 
think that a district court's denial of a motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel 
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would be reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal. However, Mr. Hall contends 
that, the language of Charboneau, Workman, and Eby notwithstanding, the Idaho 
Supreme Court no longer treats the evaluation of a motion for appointment of post-
conviction counsel as a discretionary decision and, therefore, the abuse of discretion 
standard cannot apply on appeal. 
The "possibility of a valid claim" standard that was coined in Charboneau, and 
reiterated in Swader, is a strictly legal standard that leaves no room for the district court 
to exercise any discretion. Under that standard, if there is the possibility of a valid claim 
(which is a purely legal question) the petitioner is entitled to the appointment of counsel, 
while if there is no possibility of a valid claim (which is, again, a purely legal question) 
the petitioner is not entitled to the appointment of counsel. This was made clear in 
Swader and Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339 (2009). 
Swader was the first Idaho Supreme Court case to interpret and apply 
Charboneau's "possibility of a valid claim" standard. In Swader, the district court had 
applied the wrong legal standard in denying the petitioner's motion for appointment of 
counsel but, instead of remanding the case for the district court to exercise its discretion 
in light of the correct standard, the Supreme Court applied the correct standard itself, 
determined that the petitioner-appellant had raised the possibility of a valid claim, 
reversed the district court's order denying counsel, and then remanded the case to the 
district court. Swader, 143 Idaho at 653-55. 
In Melton, although the result was different, the analysis was the same. In that 
case, although the Supreme Court held that the district court had erred in failing to 
consider the petitioner's motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel prior to 
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summarily dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief, it declined the 
petitioner's request to remand the case to the district court for an exercise of the district 
judge's discretion and, instead, held that the error in failing to rule on the motion was 
essentially harmless because the petitioner's "successive petition for post-conviction 
relief did not raise the possibility of a valid claim." Melton, 148 Idaho at 342. 
In light of Swader and Melton, Mr. Hall contends that the decision to appoint 
counsel in a post-conviction case is discretionary in name only,5 and is really a strict 
question of law. As such, he contends that any decision by a district court to deny a 
post-conviction petitioner counsel must be reviewed de novo on appeal. See 
Castorena v. General Elee., 149 Idaho 609, 713 (2010) ("This Court exercises free 
review over questions of law."). 
5 In at least one other context the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that its "abuse 
of discretion" standard of review was somewhat of a misnomer: 
When there is a motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial error 
supported by a contemporaneous objection to the underlying procedural 
or evidentiary error we review the denial of a motion for mistrial for 
reversible error. 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge 
reasonably exercised his discretion in light of circumstances 
existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the 
question must be whether the event which precipitated the 
motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed 
in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for 
mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of 
discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more 
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is 
upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that 
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to 
declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, 
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error. 
When there has been a contemporaneous objection we determine 
factually if there was prosecutorial misconduct, then we determine 
whether the error was harmless. 
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C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hall's Request For Appointment Of 
Post-Conviction Counsel Because His Petition Suggested, At A Minimum, The 
Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
Mr. Hall maintains that his Petition raised, at a minimum, the possibility of at least 
three valid claims, namely (1) that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily made because his attorney falsely promised him that he would receive 
probation and drug court, (2) that he was denied due process when the State failed to 
disclose exculpatory evidence regarding misconduct at the crime laboratory prior to his 
guilty pleas, and (3) that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas when Mr. Hall informed him about the Brady material. 
1. Invalid Guilty Pleas Claim 
One of Mr. Hall's claims was that his guilty pleas were involuntary because his 
attorney promised him that, if he pled guilty, he would receive probation and drug court 
and not serve time in prison. (R., p.6.) In rejecting this claim, the district court 
explained that it found Uno merit to Hall's allegation" because U[p]rior to pleading guilty, 
Hall completed a guilty plea questionnaire in each of his cases" in which he "affirmed in 
the questionnaire the terms of his plea agreement" and "responded in each[6] 
questionnaire that no person had promised a special sentence, reward, favorable 
treatment or leniency with regard to his plea." (R., p.4S.) 
While the record of guilty plea proceedings is relevant to a subsequent claim that 
the plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily, "the barrier of the plea or 
sentencing proceeding record, although imposing, is not invariably insurmountable." 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007) (citations omitted). 
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Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). In administering the writ of habeas 
corpus, 
federal courts cannot fairly adopt a per se rule excluding all possibility that 
a defendant's representations at the time his guilty plea was accepted 
were so much the product of such factors as misunderstanding, duress, or 
misrepresentation by others as to make the guilty plea a constitutionally 
inadequate basis for imprisonment 
Id. at 75. This Court sees the "Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act as an expansion 
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and not as a denial of the same." See Dionne v. State, 93 
Idaho 235, 237 (1969). In addressing post conviction claims regarding the nature of a 
plea, this Court has not adopted a per se rule limiting review to the record of the 
proceedings at which the plea was taken, to the exclusion of additional evidence of what 
led to the entry of the plea. See McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847 (2004) (considering 
evidence outside of the written plea agreement to determine whether plea was the 
result of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
In light of the law on this matter, the district court erred when it concluded, based 
solely on its review of the guilty plea questionnaire, that Mr. Hall had failed to raise even 
the possibility of a valid claim. 
2. Brady Violation Claim 
The second of Mr. Hall's claims was that his conviction was obtained in violation 
of his right to due process under the United States and Idaho Constitutions because the 
State failed to disclose eXCUlpatory evidence concerning misconduct at the crime 
6 It appears that one questionnaire, containing both case numbers, was completed. 
(Guilty Plea Questionnaire (augmentation).) 
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laboratory. (R., pp.2, 6, 8-10.) In concluding that this claim did not merit the 
appointment of counsel and should be summarily dismissed, the district court explained, 
When a defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty all challenges to 
non-jurisdictional defects are simultaneously waived. As discussed 
above, the Court finds that Hall's guilty plea was not induced by a false 
promise and that the plea was therefore knowingly and voluntarily made. 
Because his plea was knowing and voluntary Hall waived his ability to 
claim that improprieties at the state lab led to his conviction. 
(R., pp.49-50 (footnote citing Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826 (Ct. App. 1985) 
omitted).) 
The district court's conclusion that Mr. Hall's allegations did not give rise to the 
possibility of valid claim because he waived any such claim when he pled guilty is 
incorrect. See State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 432-37 (Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing 
that a Brady violation may render a guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary 
and, therefore, may be a proper basis to withdraw a guilty plea under I.C.R. 33(c)); 
State v. Simons, 112 Idaho 254, 259 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that "if exculpatory 
evidence is withheld and material," then a defendant who has pled guilty "was denied 
constitutionally effective assistance of counsel and will not be bound by her plea") 
(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
3. Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea Claim 
The third claim raised by Mr. Hall was that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel when his attorney refused to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea upon being 
apprised of the Brady material by Mr. Hall. (R., pp.3, 6, 8-10.) In rejecting this claim, 
the district court concluded that any such motion would have been "frivolous" and again 
asserted that Mr. Hall could not have moved to withdraw his guilty pleas based on his 
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discovery of improperly-withheld Brady material because his guilty pleas waived any 
such claim. (R., pp.51-53.) 
The district court's conclusions are contradicted by the case law cited in the 
argument on the previous claim. See Simons, 112 Idaho at 259. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hall's Motion For A 
Continuance Because Its Reasoning Was Legally Incorrect 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hall asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
Motion for Continuance because the basis for its decision was legally incorrect. As 
such, Mr. Hall is entitled to have the judgments of dismissal vacated, with this matter 
remanded to provide him with an opportunity to present evidence that supports his 
claims related to misconduct at the crime laboratory.? 
B. Standard Of Review 
A district court's decision to deny a motion for a continuance is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. "[T]he denial of a motion for continuance will not be an abuse of 
discretion unless it can be shown that the substantial rights of the defendant have been 
prejudiced." State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 106 (1998) (citations omitted). When an 
exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a three part 
inquiry. First, the district court must rightly perceive the issue as one of discretion. 
? If this Court finds in Mr. Hall's favor as to his first argument, then this argument will be 
moot. 
14 
Second, the district court must act within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices. Finally, the district 
court must reach its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 
600 (1989). 
c. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hall's Motion For A 
Continuance Because Its Reasoning Was Legally Incorrect 
Mr. Hall responded to the district court's Notice by requesting a continuance in 
order to obtain information and documents that would support his claim that misconduct 
at the State crime laboratory affected the test results in his cases. (R., pp.133-34.) In 
denying this Motion and summarily dismissing his petitions, the district court explained 
that any misconduct involving the purported drugs in his criminal cases was "irrelevant" 
because, by pleading guilty, he "waived" any and all claims concerning failure to 
disclose Brady material. (R., p.137.) Depriving Mr. Hall of a meaningful opportunity to 
respond to the district court's intent to dismiss his claims prejudiced his substantial 
rights. See Banks v. State, 123 Idaho 953, 954 (1993) (the reason that a district court's 
notice is required to be specific is to provide a petitioner with a meaningful opportunity 
to respond). 
It is unclear how the district court came to the conclusion that a prosecutor's 
failure to disclose Brady material, which comes to light only after a guilty plea has been 
entered, is "waived" by a defendant's guilty plea. While the district court cited to Stone, 
that case does not have a holding as broad as the district court's reading of it indicates. 
In Stone, the petitioner, who pled guilty, challenged his conviction in post-conviction 
based on "the allegedly illegal search and seizure of [his] car." In rejecting this claim as 
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a basis for post-conviction relief, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained, "A valid guilty 
plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses. An alleged illegal search and 
seizure does not affect the validity of a conviction based upon a knowing and voluntary 
guilty plea." Stone, 108 Idaho at 863-64 (citations omitted).) 
It does not appear that Stone alleged either that the State withheld exculpatory 
evidence or that his attorney was ineffective for failing to pursue a motion to suppress. 
As such, the holding in Stone has no bearing on Mr. Hall's claim concerning the State's 
Brady violation. It also does not appear to apply to Mr. Hall's related claim that his 
attorney was ineffective for failing to file motions to withdraw his guilty pleas upon 
learning of the Brady material and upon Mr. Hall's request. See Gardner, 126 Idaho at 
432-37 (recognizing that a Brady violation may render a guilty plea unknowing, 
unintelligent, or involuntary and, therefore, may be a proper basis to withdraw a guilty 
plea under LC.R. 33(c)); Simons, 112 Idaho at 259 (holding that "if exculpatory evidence 
is withheld and material," then a defendant who has pled guilty "was denied 
constitutionally effective assistance of counsel and will not be bound by her plea") 
(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
Because the district court's reasoning in denying Mr. Hall's motion for a 
continuance was legally incorrect, and the denial of his motion prejudiced his substantial 
rights, it abused its discretion when it denied his motion. As such, Mr. Hall respectfully 
requests that the judgments of dismissal be vacated, and that this matter be remanded 
to provide Mr. Hall with an opportunity to present evidence that supports his claims 
concerning misconduct at the State crime laboratory. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Hall respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgments of dismissal, and remand this matter for the appointment of post-
conviction counsel. In the alternative, Mr. Hall requests that this Court vacate the 
judgments of dismissal, and remand this matter to provide him with an opportunity to 
present evidence that supports his claims concerning misconduct at the State crime 
laboratory. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2013. 
" //// 
Spi~R J. HAHN 
Dep,ui~tate Appellate Public Defender 
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